Understanding the “Donroe Doctrine”

The term “Donroe Doctrine” entered American political discourse in the chaotic days following the January 3, 2026, U.S. operation that seized Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and transported him to the United States. What began as a half‑joking riff by POTUS47—an assertion that he had “superseded” the Monroe Doctrine and that “they now call it the 'Donroe Doctrine ' "¹ —has rapidly evolved into a shorthand for a new, interventionist posture the contours of which are still emerging.

Although the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 warned European powers against interference in the Western Hemisphere, the ‘Donroe Doctrine” appears to invert the logic: it asserts not merely a defensive perimeter but an active, discretionary right of intervention. The Venezuela raid became its founding act ¹.

A doctrine born of action, not articulation

The administration has not issued a formal policy statement. Instead, the doctrine is being inferred from the operation itself and from the president’s public remarks¹. In this sense, the Donroe Doctrine resembles the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904—an expansion of Monroe’s original warning—but with fewer constraints and a far broader definition of what constitutes a threat.

The raid on Venezuela was justified variously as a law‑enforcement action, a national‑security imperative, a response to foreign influence, and a reclamation of U.S. oil interests¹ ⁴ ⁵. This shifting rationale has left analysts struggling to identify the doctrine’s boundaries. What is clear is that the administration sees hemispheric affairs as an arena for direct, unilateral action, unconstrained by traditional diplomatic or congressional processes ⁶.

Legal and constitutional shockwaves

Legal scholars have been among the first to sound alarms. Reporting and analysis in The New Yorker describe the operation as a brazen assertion of executive power, bypassing congressional authorization and stretching the legal logic of extraterritorial arrest to its limits⁶. The administration’s reliance on precedents such as the Noriega case—arguing that a foreign leader is not a head of state unless the U.S. recognizes him as such—suggests a doctrine rooted in presidential prerogative rather than international law ⁵ ⁶.

Walter Olson’s commentary reinforces this view, noting that the superseding indictment of Maduro contains almost no references to oil or foreign influence, despite these being central to the administration’s public messaging⁵. The gap between legal justification and political rationale underscores the doctrine's improvisational nature.

Historical warnings and precedents

Historian Timothy Snyder situates the “Donroe Doctrine” within a longer pattern of authoritarian power projection, warning that unilateral renditions of foreign leaders have historically destabilized both the targeted region and the intervening state³. Snyder argues that the operation marks a departure from the post‑1945 rules‑based order and aligns more closely with 19th‑century great‑power behavior—precisely the dynamic Monroe sought to prevent ³.

His analysis suggests that doctrines born from unilateral force tend to expand, often in unpredictable and dangerous ways³.

Strategic ambiguity and operational opacity

Joyce Vance’s reporting, including her conversation with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer, highlights the lack of interagency coordination surrounding the raid ¹ ². Key national‑security officials appear to have been informed late or excluded entirely, raising questions about process, planning, and the absence of a defined endgame ².

The administration’s public statements—ranging from promises to “run Venezuela” to vague commitments to restore democracy—suggest a doctrine driven more by impulse than strategy¹². This ambiguity has already created a power vacuum in Caracas, where competing factions, militias, and foreign intelligence services are maneuvering for advantage ³ ⁷.

Oil, influence, and the logic of intervention

Both Robert Reich and Walter Olson point to the centrality of oil in the administration’s rhetoric ⁴ ⁵. Reich argues that the “Donroe Doctrine” may be less about hemispheric security and more about resource extraction, with officials openly discussing the need to “open up” Venezuela’s oil sector to American firms⁴. Olson notes the irony that the legal case against Maduro barely mentions oil at all ⁵.

If the Monroe Doctrine once warned Europe to stay out of the Americas, the “Donroe Doctrine” may be signaling that the United States reserves the right to enter whenever strategic resources are at stake⁴ ⁵.

Geopolitical blowback: The Putin dimension

Masha Gessen’s analysis in The New York Times introduces a crucial external dimension: Russia stands to benefit from the chaos⁷. By removing Maduro—an unreliable but familiar partner—the U.S. may inadvertently strengthen Moscow’s hand in the region⁷. A destabilized Venezuela could become fertile ground for Russian influence operations, energy maneuvering, and anti‑American propaganda ⁷.

The “Donroe Doctrine” risks becoming a strategic miscalculation, weakening U.S. influence even as it asserts U.S. power ⁷.

Regional reverberations and the risk of escalation

Reich’s commentary captures the growing fear that Venezuela is only the beginning ⁴. POTUS47’s off‑hand remarks about Colombia, Mexico, Cuba, and even Greenland suggest a doctrine with no limiting principle⁴. Latin American governments are concerned, and anti‑American sentiment is rising ⁴ ⁷.

Where the Monroe Doctrine once promised stability through deterrence, the Donroe Doctrine may usher in instability through unpredictability ³ ⁴ ⁷.

Sources

¹ Joyce Vance, “Trump Strikes Venezuela; Arrests President Maduro,” Civil Discourse, January 3, 2026. https://joycevance.substack.com/p/trump-strikes-venezuela-arrests-president

² Joyce Vance, “Live with Jake Sullivan and Jon Finer,” Civil Discourse, January 4, 2026. https://joycevance.substack.com/p/live-with-jake-sullivan-and-jon-finer

³ Timothy Snyder, “Venezuela – The Precedents,” Thinking About…, January 4, 2026. https://snyder.substack.com/p/venezuela-the-precedents

⁴ Robert Reich, “The Quagmire of Trump’s Venezuela,” Robert Reich’s Substack, January 4, 2026. https://robertreich.substack.com/p/the-quagmire-of-trumps-venezuela

⁵ Walter Olson, “The Rendition of Nicolás Maduro: Oil’s Well That Ends Well,” Overlawyered, January 4, 2026. https://walterolson.substack.com/p/the-rendition-of-nicolas-maduro-oils

⁶ Isaac Chotiner, “The Brazen Illegality of Trump’s Venezuela Operation,” The New Yorker, January 3, 2026. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-brazen-illegality-of-trumps-venezuela-operation

⁷ Masha Gessen, “Maduro’s Ouster Plays Right into Putin’s Hands,” The New York Times, January 4, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/04/opinion/putin-maduro-venezuela.html

H. Pike Oliver

H. Pike Oliver focuses on master-planned communities. He is co-author of Transforming the Irvine Ranch: Joan Irvine, William Pereira, Ray Watson, and THE BIG PLAN, published by Routledge in 2022.

Early in his career, Pike worked for public agencies, including the California Governor's Office of Planning and Research, where he was a principal contributor to An Urban Strategy for California. For the next three decades, he was involved in master-planned development on the Irvine Ranch in Southern California, as well as other properties in western North America and abroad.

Beginning in 2009, Pike taught real estate development at Cornell University and directed the undergraduate program in Urban and Regional Studies. He relocated to Seattle in 2013 and, from 2016 to 2020, served as a lecturer in the Runstad Department of Real Estate at the University of Washington, where he also served as its chair.

Pike graduated from San Francisco State University's urban studies and planning program and received a master's degree in urban planning from UCLA. He is a member of the American Planning Association and the Urban Land Institute and a founder and emeritus member of the California Planning Roundtable.

https://urbanexus.com
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